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ccording to the most recent IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO),1 the recovery has 
suffered new setbacks and uncertainty weighs heavily on the future. The IMF forecast, 
unveiled in Tokyo ahead of the IMF-World Bank 2012 Annual Meetings last week, sees 
only a gradual strengthening of activity from the relatively disappointing pace of early 2012. 
Projected global growth, at 3.3% and 3.6% in 2012 and 2013, respectively, is weaker than in the 
July 2012 WEO Update, which was in turn lower than in the April 2012 WEO.  
The report argues that the contracting effects of austerity measures in a number of countries (as 
measured  by  the  multipliers),  in  fact,  may  be  larger  than  assumed  by  most  of  the  official 
forecasts, including that of the IMF. This implies the risk that the next WEO forecasts may prove 
to be even weaker than the current ones. Against this background, the IMF recommends that, 
should  growth  fall  significantly  short  of  the  current  projections,  countries  with  room  to 
manoeuvre should smooth their planned adjustments over 2013 and beyond. Furthermore, the 
Fund  sees  arguments  for  maintaining  the  very  accommodating  monetary  stance,  including 
unconventional measures, as interest rates are near the zero lower bound.  
Structural  reform  measures  are  considered  necessary  practically  everywhere,  albeit  of  a 
different  nature  in  different  countries,  and  a  longer-run  pre-condition  for  a  sustainable 
stabilisation and recovery at world level. Similarly, stabilisation and credible reduction of public 
debt accompanied by an increasing efficiency of public administration are also equally necessary 
conditions in most countries for ensuring balanced and sustainable growth. Despite fears in 
some camps that the exceptionally accommodating monetary policy in the US and the eurozone 
could pose long-term risks of inflation, the current state of the markets still warn against a 
premature exit strategy and returning too early to a more stringent stance of monetary policy by 
both the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank. At some point, however, the stance of 
monetary policy must be reversed in favour of the traditional objective of inflation control. 
                                                   
1 “Coping with High Debt and Sluggish Growth”, World Economic Outlook (WEO) World Economic 
and  Financial  Surveys,  International  Monetary  Fund,  Washington,  D.C.,  October  2012 
(http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/index.htm). 
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A perennial issue in macroeconomic policy analysis, namely the timing of the effect of policy 
measures, seems to have received relatively little attention even in authoritative reports such as 
the IMF WEO. However, a comprehensive analysis of the current policy stance and its potential 
effects over the short, medium and long run would require that the question of the timing of the 
implementation and the effects of the three main categories of economic policy (fiscal, monetary 
and structural) ought to be dealt with more openly than is now the case. 
In fact, a macroeconomic model simulation would show that timing and lags in their effects on 
economic activity, employment, inflation and external balances would be very different for fiscal 
consolidation, structural reforms and monetary accommodation. Similarly the pace of the policy 
implementation would play an important role.   
As  regards  the  fiscal  consolidation  that  is  underway,  or  planned,  in  a  large  number  of  the 
advanced economies, there can be little uncertainty that their immediate consequence will be a 
fall in private consumption and investment. No doubt that restrictive policies, involving pension 
and wage cuts or a reduction in the number of civil servants, such as those implemented in the 
Mediterranean  countries,  will  depress  private  spending.  In  other  advanced  economies, 
tightening policy measures are more prudent but increasing financial constraints on spending of 
central  governments  and  local  authorities  are  felt  practically  everywhere.  Sluggish  global 
growth, a persistent euro area crisis and gloomy expectations about a full recovery are trimming 
down the number of countries that have room to manoeuvre and increasing the number of those 
having to face a tighter budget constraint.   
On the other hand, the loose monetary policy stance, while providing an apparent stabilisation in 
monetary and financial markets, has patently proven to be ineffective on aggregate demand, 
unable of boosting business investment and confidence. While some banks in some countries are 
insolvent  or  in  danger  of  becoming  insolvent,  non-bank  corporations  in  many  advanced 
economies display record-high levels of cash and may even suffer from the low level of short-
term interest rates. Thus, the accommodating monetary policy is clearly not in a position to 
boost overall demand in the economy, as validated by the old saying; “you can lead a horse to 
water,  but  you  can’t  make  him  drink.”  This  observation  points  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
accommodating monetary policy in most countries, perhaps with the exception of the United 
States, has had little or no effect on aggregate demand. 
Concerning the strong need for wide-reaching labour- and product-market reform measures, 
they have for a long time been at the top of the list of the policy recommendations of almost 
everybody.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Mediterranean  countries,  as  well  as  most  European 
countries and other advanced economies over the coming years must face up to exceptional 
challenges due to ageing, climate change, environmental damage and natural resources scarcity, 
which will require a transition towards new systems of production and consumption. Policies 
framed in such perspective are essential for ensuring macroeconomic stability and sustainability 
and, thus, for avoiding future crisis. However, they have long lead times as far as the planning 
and  implementation  are  concerned  and  require  severe  reorientations  of  both  demand  and 
supply in the economies. And more importantly, in the current situation, their beneficial effects 
will  be  felt  with  a  lag  and  only  very  gradually  over  a  longer  time  span  through  increased 
efficiency and productivity. If anything, a flourishing literature shows evidence that structural 
reforms tend to have a negative effect on output over the short-term, amplifying the downturn 
inflected by fiscal consolidation. 
In light of the foregoing, a question to be urgently considered is whether the implementation of 
tough austerity measures in a number of countries, including also the UK, the US and France, can 
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or  even  reversal  of  the  reform  measures  in  the  medium  term,  increasing  inconsistencies 
between the different policy components. There is also the danger that the consolidation policies 
result not only in lower public consumption and transfers but also in possible delays in public 
investments and other expenditures that should work as a complement to the much-needed 
reform measures. This could have adverse effects in the medium and longer run. 
The question is therefore whether a more pronounced ‘smoothing’ of adjustments should take 
place not only in the countries with room for manoeuvre, as suggested by the IMF, but in fact, 
and  perhaps  more  importantly,  in  the  countries  that  are  now  confronted  with  the  strict 
conditionality imposed by the ‘troika’.  
The main problem in this approach is the financial constraints. Smoothing the fiscal adjustment 
implies  that  deficit  targets  will  be  overrun  and  additional  resources  will  be  needed  in  the 
immediate future. Who is going to fill the financial gap, if the budget targets and the external 
budget constraint are binding? Can the profile become smoother following the argument that 
this is the necessary quid pro quo to ensure better conditions for successful reform policies, and 
hence growth, in the medium and long run?  
More  fundamentally,  can  we  expect  growth  to  resume  if  the  adjustment  is  not  completed? 
Countries that have experienced bubbles are unlikely to see acceptable growth rates, i.e. large 
enough to impact unemployment and deficits, until the excesses are absorbed. In an ideal world, 
fiscal  policy  would  favour  the  adjustment  and  make  it  less  painful,  yet  under  the  current 
conditions, there is little hope this can fully work.  
The path of future growth is also of extreme importance. Given that growth rates before the 
crisis were driven by bubbles and excesses in some parts of the economies, realistically, we 
should not expect such rates to return without further strong reform measures.  
A key condition for a credible and successful additional fiscal smoothing in the short term is 
therefore strict – and credible – adhesion to a much more rigorous and pronounced medium- 
and longer-run fiscal consolidation and structural reforms in practically all advanced economies. 
It may well be argued that this would be necessary to enhance confidence in business in general 
and especially in financial markets. 